Spillover Effects of Participation in the 1992 Perot Movement:
Perot Activists in the 1994 U.S. House Elections

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The history of our politics is that losing causes often produce winning leaders. The current generation of Democrats -- starting with President Clinton -- cut their teeth in the 1972 McGovern campaign. Many of the Republicans now in power started out as 1964 youths for Goldwater. Perot's legions are likely to furnish many of their successors.

--David S. Broder (1995)

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ABSTRACT

The Perot candidacy in 1992 is appropriately understood as an important extension of candidate-centered politics in U.S. presidential politics. Our purpose in this paper is to demonstrate a link between participation in the 1992 Perot campaign, and active involvement in U.S. House races in 1994. Our analysis takes into account two rival hypotheses in accounting for active participation in 1994 congressional campaigns: predispositions to participate in House campaigns, and mobilization effects linked to the compelling choice our respondents may have faced in 1994. We employ a panel design to impose aggressive controls, but we find a consistent significant effect on 1994 major-party activity of mobilization in the 1992 Perot campaign. Despite the strongly anti-party character of the Perot movement, and even in a sample of relatively independent, anti-party, and disaffected Perot activists, this “spillover” effect from one campaign to another is present, and leads us to question the degree to which candidate-centered politics undermines the long-term interests of the two major parties.
Many analysts have located the presidential selection process as the principal source of candidate-centered politics because of the visibility of presidential elections, and because presidential candidates have been forced to free lance as individual entrepreneurs, especially in the nomination process (Edsall 1984; Wattenberg 1991). In the open, post-reform nomination process, individual candidates jockey for position on the ideological scale, they attempt to identify issues that will help them mobilize a following, and they attack other nomination contenders within the party in their attempt to gain an edge (Polsby 1982). Because it is a nomination contest, they are largely on their own as they attempt to attract the resources necessary to mount a national campaign: money, activist volunteers, a professional staff, and visibility among nomination voters. Having created their own individual campaign organization in order to win the nomination, they continue in the general election (assuming they win) to conduct their own campaign, relatively free of the constraints of a national party organization. In fact, it is not uncommon for a candidate to attempt to control the national party organization, rather than vice versa. Voters, in turn, respond to the choices they are asked to make based heavily on the personality characteristics of competing candidates (Kinder 1986; Miller et al., 1987). The upshot is that candidate-centered politics may undermine long-term party loyalties in the electorate and to weaken the already fragmented system of governance in the U.S.

Although he was not a candidate for a major-party nomination, Ross Perot’s campaign represents in many ways the culmination of candidate-centered politics in American elections. Not only was he a candidate who relied heavily upon his own resources to attract a following, but he mounted an independent anti-party campaign that mobilized hundreds of thousands of activists to place his name on the ballot on all 50 states. When he re-entered the race in early October (after dropping out during the Democratic National Convention), his campaign focused on the failure of “politics as usual” and broad discontent with Washington, the two political parties, and their nominees, Bill Clinton and George Bush. Perot had taken the personalized, candidate-driven politics of presidential nominations one step further by running a populistic appeal directly for the White House, bypassing the nomination process altogether. He was remarkably successful. In attracting about 19% of the vote, he out polled every independent candidate in the 20th Century, save ex-president Theodore Roosevelt in 1912.

In examining the implications of candidate-centered politics in the presidential nomination process, we have found that candidate-driven competition is not necessarily destructive of the party’s interests. In fact, political activity for a nomination candidate -- even one who loses -- stimulates activity in other campaigns. For example, we find that activists who opposed the eventual nominee still become active in the general election stage of the campaign on behalf of their champion’s competitor from the spring wars. Indeed, the more fully mobilized activists were in backing a losing candidate, the more involved they are in the general election stage (Stone, Atkeson and Rapoport 1992). This is hardly the stuff of candidate-centered factionalism driving wedges into a previously durable party coalition, at least among party activists. In addition to this “positive carryover” from the nomination to the general election stages of the presidential campaign, we have also found evidence of “positive spillover” from the presidential arena to U.S. House campaigns (McCann, Partin, Rapoport and Stone 1996). Once again, the more mobilized
that activists were by candidates in the nomination stage, the more actively involved they became in House races, even controlling for their past levels of activity in House races. This effect is evident even for dissident candidates such as Jesse Jackson in 1984 and Pat Robertson in 1988, and may be an important mechanism whereby presidential politics effects broad-scale and enduring party change (Pastor and Stone 1995).

Thus, contrary to those who suggest that the personalized, candidate-centered politics of contemporary presidential nominations factionalizes the party and depresses attachment to and involvement in the party (Lowi 1985, Wattenberg 1991), we argue that nomination contests draw people into the parties, elevate their perceptions of the stakes in electoral politics, and generate, rather than depress, party activity. In short, presidential nomination campaigns are recruitment paths into the party.¹

The Perot movement in 1992 provides an extreme example of candidate-centered politics, and a severe test of the positive carryover and spillover hypotheses. Perot was not only attacking the other candidates, as frequently occurs in nomination races, he was also attacking the parties. Our research on the 1992 Perot movement shows that his volunteer backers were extraordinarily dissatisfied with the parties and their candidates, and much more distrustful of the political process than ordinary citizens (Atkeson, McCann, Rapoport and Stone 1995). Moreover, this discontent played a central role in motivating people to be active in the Perot campaign both in the spring-summer preconvention period, and in the general election campaign after he redeclared in October (Partin, Weber, Rapoport and Stone 1994).

If Perot’s activist constituency was attracted to him in part because of their alienation from ordinary party politics, what might this mean for the positive carryover and spillover hypotheses? Can we find evidence of spillover from an anti-party campaign like Perot’s to campaigns run by the major parties? In nomination campaigns, the race is within the political party whose members share a broad commitment to the traditions and goals of the party. Thus, backers of Pat Robertson in 1988 presumably had no difficulty determining that they preferred George Bush to Michael Dukakis in the fall, however much they would have preferred that the

¹If newly mobilized participants remain active in other campaigns, the potential for change in the party may be extensive, especially when a candidate’s backers differ substantially from the rest of the party. The Jesse Jackson 1984 campaign and the 1988 Robertson effort are examples of losing nomination campaigns which nonetheless may have had substantial long-term effects on their parties because of their presence in subsequent nomination contests, and the necessity of party contestants to appeal to them (Rapoport and Stone 1994; Pastor and Stone 1995). Observers of the nomination process must be careful not to equate “change” in the parties with “weakening” the parties. The fact that a Robertson or a Jackson sought to change the party by mobilizing new participants with a different agenda than was broadly accepted at the time of their candidacies does not mean that the conflict surrounding their nomination campaigns was destructive of the party. Indeed, this process of mobilization and carryover/spillover may be an important mechanism whereby parties adapt to (and help shape) major shifts in public opinion (Stone 1993).
GOP had turned to Robertson rather than Bush in the spring.\(^2\) Because Perot’s campaign in 1992 was not merely candidate-centered, but also quite virulently anti-party, examining activists mobilized by Perot for effects on their subsequent party activity provides a particularly difficult test for the hypothesis.

If spillover and carryover effects can be linked to the 1992 Perot campaign, an important basis for understanding the long-term effect of Perot on the two-party system may be identified. In the case of nomination politics, we argue that nomination candidacies change the parties because of their long-term mobilization effects. Our question is whether an analogous process occurred that can be linked to mobilization by Perot. Can we find evidence that participation for Perot had an independent effect on involvement for the major political parties? Despite the anti-party nature of the Perot campaign, we contend that it held the potential to draw participants into the electoral process, bring them into contact with politically involved individuals, alert them to the stakes in electoral conflict, and ironically encourage participation in future major-party campaigns. This amounts to a socialization effect whereby individual candidates attract participants whose involvement then encourages further participation in other campaigns.

In the case of party activists, we have looked at “carryover” by examining what supporters of losing nomination candidates do to support the nomination winner in the fall. We look at spillover by tracking their activity in U.S. House campaigns in the fall. In the case of Perot activists, a simple analogy to the carryover effect is not obvious because Perot was not a nomination loser who then disappeared from the scene leaving his backers with no general election champion.\(^3\) The most obviously comparable expectation is with spillover to other, nonpresidential, campaigns. Our focus, therefore, is on Perot activists’ involvement in 1994 U.S. House campaigns. The spillover hypothesis is that the greater the mobilization for Perot’s 1992 campaign, the greater the involvement in U.S. House campaigns two years later in the 1994 off-year elections.

**Data Sources**

In 1992, we identified a national sample of potential Perot activists from a data base made available by the Perot campaign. During the late spring and early summer of 1992, the Perot campaign maintained an 800-number phone bank to receive the thousands of calls from individuals throughout the country expressing an interest in his campaign. We mailed a survey to a sample of 1901 individuals from this data base in September, 1992 after Perot had dropped out of the campaign. We received usable responses from 1321, for a response rate of 69%. We

\(^2\)But note that the carryover and spillover effects are independent of candidate differentials associated with the general election race. Thus, they are clearly mobilization effects linked directly to involvement in the nomination campaigns, and independent of the choice offered in the fall campaign.

\(^3\)In 1996 it will possible to look for carryover from 1992 Perot activity to involvement in 1996 presidential nomination and general election campaigns.
We also asked about involvement in Senate and Gubernatorial elections, but our focus in this paper is on House races. We asked specifically whether respondents had collected signatures for a ballot petition, attended meetings or rallies, tried to convince friends to support Perot, telephoning or door-to-door canvassing, organized meetings or coffees, or held a voluntary or paid position in the campaign. For a detailed analysis, see Partin et al., 1994.

During the early fall wave of the survey, we asked respondents about their activity levels for Perot prior to his dropping out of the race, as well as tapping their histories of involvement in previous major-party campaigns. In addition, we included questions on attitudes toward and perceptions of the candidates and parties, their involvement in a variety of interest groups, their opinions on a range of issues, and a standard battery of demographic indicators. In the 1992 post-election wave, we asked about general election campaign involvement for Perot, Bush, and Clinton, and other subpresidential races, in addition to repeating a range of partisan, issue, and candidate items. In the 1994 wave, we repeated a full range of partisan, issue, and candidate items, but in addition focused attention on activity levels in the U.S. House races. By continuing the study into 1994, we can study spillover effects from activity in the 1992 Perot movement to the partisan context of 1994, when Ross Perot was not represented in the campaigns being waged in our respondents’ home districts.

A detailed analysis of these potential Perot activists’ attitudes and involvement in 1992 is not our purpose here (cf. Atkeson et al., 1995; Partin et al., 1994). However, we should point out that our strategy of sampling from those who called the Perot campaign’s 800-number was successful in yielding a sample of potential Perot activists. Fully 73% of the sample was involved in some way in the movement prior to Perot’s dropping out in the late summer, with about a third collecting signatures in the ballot drive, 29% attending a rally, 12% canvassing for Perot, and 64% convincing a friend to support Perot. Fully two-thirds of those active for Perot engaged in two or more of the activities included in our battery of questions. Activity levels in the campaign after Perot redclared in October dropped as about 62% engaged in any activities for Perot during the fall campaign, and only 54% ultimately voted for Perot.

Identifying Mobilization Effects from the Perot Campaign

We have established elsewhere that the Perot sample was highly disaffected compared with the electorate as a whole, and compared with activists in the two major parties (Rapoport et al., 1993; Atkeson et al., 1995). We have also shown that this disaffection had a direct bearing on

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participation in the Perot campaign (Partin et al., 1994). However, before exploring the spillover hypothesis, it is worth noting here the disaffected nature of the entire sample, and the Perot activists in particular (Table 1). Compared with those in the sample who did not become engaged in the Perot campaign, Perot activists were more likely to be strictly independent, to distrust the government, to evaluate the both parties (and their candidates) negatively, and strongly to agree that the parties do more harm than good in American politics.

[Table 1 About Here]

These sorts of indicators are normally associated with nonparticipation in electoral politics. But of course, participation in electoral politics is normally within the two-party framework, and the discontent that Perot activists felt was aimed primarily at the two-party system. Nonetheless, the spillover hypothesis expects a positive relationship between participation in the 1992 Perot campaign, and involvement in major-party U.S. House campaigns two years later.

At the simplest level, our expectation of the spillover hypothesis is that those who were mobilized into Perot’s effort in 1992 were more likely to be active in U.S. House races than those who were not mobilized by Perot. Table 2 shows consistent, if preliminary, support for a spillover effect from activity for Perot in 1992 to involvement in 1994 House campaigns. Respondents who did not participate in the Perot campaign in any way were about 8% less active in 1994 congressional races than those who were involved for Perot. The differences persist among Democrats, Independents, and Republicans in the sample, and when activity in Democratic and Republican House races is examined separately. The usual partisan differences are evident (Republicans are much more active in Republican House campaigns than Democrats, and vice versa), but a positive effect of working for Perot is apparent for all categories in the table, except Independents in Democratic House campaigns (where there is only a 1.5% difference).

[Table 2 About Here]

In the same sample where negativity toward the parties and lack of party identification explained activity for Perot in 1992, we find in Table 2 that activity for Perot is positively associated with active involvement in partisan House races two years earlier. Alienation and disaffection helped explain activity for Perot in 1992; can we conclude paradoxically that that same activity for Perot actually helped mobilize people for the parties two years later?

The evidence in Table 2 is suggestive, but hardly definitive. The difference we observe in 1994 congressional campaign activity between those active for Perot and those who were not drawn into his 1992 campaign may be entirely due to factors other than their Perot involvement. If so, no spillover effect from Perot into the two major parties would exist. Two possible alternative explanations must be considered: First, predispositions that enhance political participation generally may account for both the Perot activity in 1992 and involvement in House campaigns in 1994. These predispositions might include socio-economic status, a sense of
obligation that motivates participation in electoral politics, or involvement in interest or community groups that serve as fertile ground for campaign mobilization efforts (Rosenstone and Hanson 1993; Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995). A second explanation that must be taken into account is the possibility of mobilization effects tied to the 1994 House campaigns themselves. It is possible that the compelling nature of the choice facing the Perot activists in their 1994 House elections mobilized them to participate in 1994, rather than anything uniquely based on their 1992 activity for Perot (cf. Stone, Atkeson, and Rapoport 1992). These two competing explanations may be related because individuals who are predisposed to be active in one arena (such as interest groups) may be more available for mobilization efforts by a House campaign (Rosenstone and Hanson 1993). Nonetheless, both explanations must be taken into account before we can conclude that there was an independent spillover effect from the 1992 Perot campaign.

The most effective way to control for predispositional variables is to include activity levels in previous House campaigns. Fortunately, our panel design gives us powerful leverage against this alternative hypothesis. In the 1992 wave of our panel, we asked respondents about their activities in the 1992 House campaigns in their districts, as well as to recall their activities in 1988 House elections. We assume that any predispositions to participate in House election campaigns are captured by a measure combining reported activity in 1992 and 1988. In addition, we include 1992 activity levels for Clinton/Gore for Democrats, and Bush/Quayle for Republicans as a further control for predispositions to participate.

We control for the mobilization effects of the 1994 House campaigns by including a measure of relative affect toward the two major-party House candidates. The greater the attraction of one party’s candidate over the other, the stronger the motivation to participate rooted in the 1994 campaign. We also include 1994 party identification as an additional way to control for partisanship in the immediate context of the House elections. Finally, we include a measure of 1994 interest-group activity to control for the possibility that House campaigns mobilized individuals active in relevant interest groups. By employing 1994 measures of party identification and interest group activity, we are imposing especially aggressive controls because

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6 The activities we asked about were: attended a public meeting or rally, fundraising, tried to convince friends to support a candidate, telephoning or door-to-door canvassing, and contributed money.

7 We include 1988 because it is possible that 1992 activity levels understate the predisposition to participate in House elections because of our respondents’ attraction to the Perot candidacy. Thus, their commitment to the Perot campaign may have reduced their proclivity to participate in House campaigns below their normal levels. As a practical matter, our results excluding the 1988 recall measure are no different from those reported below.

8 Ideally, we would like to have previous activity levels in off-year House campaigns, because of the possibility that the opportunity costs for participating in House races go up in a presidential year. However, by including activity in the 1992 partisan presidential contests, we control for this possibility.

9 The relative affect measure is constructed from items asking respondents to provide an overall evaluation of the Democratic and Republican U.S. House candidates in their districts.
of the possibility that these 1994 attitudes and activities were themselves affected by 1992 Perot participation. Nonetheless, because of the paradoxical nature of the spillover hypothesis from Perot to the major parties, we want to be as conservative as possible in carrying out the analysis.

Table 3 reports the results of our analysis of 1994 U.S. House activity with the appropriate controls described above, along with the level of activity in the 1992 Perot campaign. We estimate the model using three dependent variables: activity in Democratic House campaigns, activity in Republican House campaigns, and a combined measure of activity in any House campaign. For the analysis of activity in Republican and Democratic campaigns, we use the standard 7-point party identification scale, evaluation measures of the two candidates in the respondent’s district, and conservative and liberal group activity measures respectively. In explaining House campaign activity in both parties, we use strength of party identification (rather than the directional measure), the absolute difference in evaluations between the House candidates to capture the party differential, and a combined index of activity in both conservative and liberal interest groups.

With only one or two exceptions, all of the control variables contribute to an explanation of 1994 House activity. There is clear evidence of spillover from 1992 partisan presidential activity, which is consistent with what we have found among major-party activists (McCann et al., 1996). The predispositional hypothesis is clearly relevant, as past activity in House races affects involvement in 1994. In addition, both 1994 party identification and 1994 group involvement affect campaign activity, which suggests that our respondents were reacting to the choices they were offered in the House races in their districts. This conclusion is also supported by the effect of House candidate evaluations in the case of Republican races (and Democratic candidate evaluation in Democratic campaigns).

[Table 3 Here]

Despite these controls for two compelling hypotheses to account for 1994 campaign activity, the spillover effect from 1992 Perot activity remains statistically significant. Thus we can conclude with considerable confidence that mobilization in the Perot campaign of 1992 independently stimulated partisan activity in the 1994 off-year elections. This is a remarkable extension of the logic of the carryover and spillover hypotheses, which so far have only been tested on within-party campaign participation. Perot’s campaign was associated with dissatisfaction with the parties and their candidates, and even within our 1992 sample of potential Perot activists, there are clear effects of disaffection from the parties on activity for Perot (see Table 1). Yet an important (and ironic) effect of his campaign was to mobilize people into electoral politics who

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10 The Perot activity measure combines activity in the pre-convention and fall phases of his campaign.

11 Groups counted as conservative (and used to explain Republican campaign activity) were: business, veterans, politically-concerned evangelical groups, anti-abortion, and conservative ideological groups. Groups counted as liberal were: teachers organizations, women’s rights, civil rights, environmental, public interest groups, labor unions, and liberal ideological groups.
then became more likely to participate in major-party campaigns two years later. Although some of the effect we observe can be linked to a "coming home" among those with a Republican or Democratic identification in the sample, we do control for 1994 partisanship, as well as including congressional activity in 1988 (before these respondents "left home"). Even with such controls, it is clear from our data that participation in the Perot campaign had a significant independent effect in stimulating 1994 congressional campaign activity.

This finding suggests the importance of campaign involvement for stimulating additional partisan activity, even when that initial activity occurred in a candidate-centered and anti-party campaign. That a similar effect exists in candidate-centered nomination campaigns, and transcends the sometimes vitriolic conflict aroused during presidential nomination races alerted us to the possibility that it might be present here. In both arenas, the effect suggests that the parties may be more resilient in an era of candidate-centered politics than some have supposed. In fact, it is precisely the candidate centered nature of the process which provides the mechanism for involving new constituencies in the party, and even in expanding the party’s base. Candidates are the most visible players in electoral politics, and often excite the strongest reactions in campaigns. The quadrennial presidential race provides an opportunity for the party (through nomination contestants) to mobilize individuals from new constituencies for future activism and party involvement (Pastor, Stone, and Rapoport, 1995). If parties can be considered conglomerates of candidate-centered campaigns (Schlesinger 1991), the spillover phenomenon is likely to provide important avenues of partisan recruitment and mobilization into other campaigns. But our findings on the Perot movement indicate that even involvement with an anti-party campaign may provide positive results for the major parties through recruitment of campaign activists. Further, if this 1994 congressional activity carries over into 1996 presidential nomination activity, the Perot movement may also have significant long-term effects on the choice of nominees of the major parties and on their issue positions. In so doing, the Perot campaign will have promoted not only campaign activists in the shorter run, but party responsiveness in the long term.

**Conclusion**

Understanding the place of the 1992 Perot movement in the larger context of American electoral politics requires us to take a longer view than who won in 1992 and why. Surely Perot and his legions contributed to the public debate by raising questions about the budget deficit, America’s place in the world economy, and political reform. At the same time, of course, his success raised questions about the adequacy of the two-party system (Lowi 1994). Despite recent speculation about whether a third party would emerge out of the Perot movement, its most enduring legacy is most likely to be its effect on the two-party system. Third parties and independent candidacies have most frequently been passing phenomena in American history, primarily because of the permeability and adaptability of the two major parties (Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus 1984). But the fact that these efforts do not usually endure beyond one or two elections, does not mean they have no long-term effect. It is not mere happenstance that the proliferation of third parties has preceded every major realignment since the 1850's (Beck 1981).
Perot voters and activists from 1992 are likely to be actively sought after by candidates in both parties. What these voters and activists do, therefore, can have a lasting effect on the balance between the parties.

We suspect that the Perot movement will be an important source of party change in the years to come. For some, it will be a way station as they move from one party to the other. Others will be mobilized into party politics for the first time as a result of their activity in 1992. Still others will seek to change their own party as a result of their participation for Perot. And of course, the fact that Perot was so successful mobilizing a large and diverse corps of volunteer activists may tempt other political entrepreneurs outside the two parties to tap into this energy. Certainly too, an important potential for affecting change exists for those who remain disengaged from major-party politics, but available for other sorties into the campaign arena. The fact that change of these sorts is stimulated by candidate-mobilized activists does not mean that such campaigns are in conflict with the long-term interests of the parties. As in the nomination process, such candidacies may go a long way toward making the parties more sensitive to evolving opinion in the electorate, and more responsive to interests that might otherwise be excluded (Geer and Shere 1992; Stone 1993; Herrera 1995). The gathering of all major Republican nomination candidates in August of 1995 before the Perot “issues conference” in Dallas demonstrates the need felt by the parties and their leaders to appeal to the Perot movement. Opening the parties and forcing them to attend to a different agenda, even if it threatens short-term coalitions on which their success depends, is surely healthy in a complex, large democracy.

This particular study does not approach all of the possible ways that the Perot movement might affect American politics. Rather, we have sought to demonstrate a link between participation for Perot and involvement in the two parties. This link holds the potential to produce significant change, but it also suggests the robust character of the American parties. Candidate-centered politics has doubtless changed the way campaigns and elections are conducted, but it does not necessarily undercut the long-standing role parties play in our politics.
References


Table 1. Differences in Disaffection between Participants and Nonparticipants in 1992 Perot Campaign.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Inactive in 1992 Perot Campaign</th>
<th>Active in 1992 Perot Campaign</th>
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<tr>
<td>(N=179)</td>
<td>(N=671)</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Strictly Independent</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>22.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Almost Never Trust Govt</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>18.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Negative-Negative on Clinton and Bush</td>
<td>12.7</td>
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<td>% Negative-Negative on both parties</td>
<td>27.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Strongly agree that parties confuse politics</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>40.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Strongly agree that best to get rid of parties altogether</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>18.9</td>
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Table 2. Differences in 1994 Congressional Campaign Activity by Involvement in 1992 Perot Campaign

<table>
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<td>(N = 511)</td>
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<td>% Active in Republican Race</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>53.5</td>
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<td>% Active in Democratic Race</td>
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<td>% Active in Republican Race</td>
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<td>% Active in Democratic Race</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Democrats</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>% Active in Republican Race</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Active in Democratic Race</td>
<td>43.3</td>
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Table 3. Determinants of 1994 House Campaign Activity

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<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>Beta</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992 Perot Activity</td>
<td>.054**</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.042**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 Bush-Quayle Activity</td>
<td>.214*</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 Clinton-Gore Activity</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>.194*</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992 Perot Activity</td>
<td>.114*</td>
<td>.217</td>
<td>-.087*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Previous House Campaign Activity</td>
<td>.133**</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.219*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eval of 1994 Dem House Candidate</td>
<td>-.100**</td>
<td>-.119</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eval of 1994 Rep House Candidate</td>
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<td>.013</td>
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<td>Absolute Difference in Evaluation of Dem and Rep House Candidates</td>
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<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 Conservative/Liberal/ All Political Group Activity</td>
<td>.264*</td>
<td>.170</td>
<td>.169*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.114</td>
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<td>1.186*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.298</td>
<td>.399</td>
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*p < .01
**p < .05